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Abstract—For many years, the pay-TV system has attracted
a lot of users. Users have recently expressed the desire to
use mobile TV or mobile payment via anonymous protocols.
The mobile users have also received their services over cellular
communications networks. Each mobile device receives services
from each head end systems. With increasing numbers of users
and the expansion of Internet, user’s privacy has become crucial
important. When a device leaves the head end system’s range,
it must receive services from another head end system. In this
paper, we review Chen et al’s scheme and we highlight some
weaknesses, including privilege insider attack and user traceability
attack. Finally, we alleviate the scheme and analyze the alleviated
scheme using both heuristic and formal methods.
Keyword: Authentication protocol, Formal model, Privacy pre-
serving, User anonymity, User traceability
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II , wireless communications were
launched, and mobile services gradually became available. At
that time, there was only one mobile operator that provided
service to a few users. Then, the second generation of mobile
communications was introduced as cellular networks under
the GSM standard [1]. Mobile communications rapidly pro-
gressed. To date, communications have changed significantly
four times. These changes and technological mutations were
introduced as different generations of wireless communica-
tions technology so that today, the fourth generation of this
method of communication is utilized. It is predicted that a new
generation of mobile communications will be introduced in
2020 that will provide users with great speed and accuracy[1],
[2], [3]. Pay-TV system has attracted many users for almost 30
years. In 1994, the number of people who used this technology
reached 3.45 million in England. It doubled after 4 years
[4]. Currently, numerous users use mobile devices to watch
TV, and many communication systems have been provided
for using the mobile-TV services [4], [5], [6], [7]. In these
systems, the user can receive services after registration in a
head end system (HES) network and store his/her information
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in the database server (DBS) of the HES. At first, the HES
only broadcasts one authentication message to all the users
who request the same service [5]. Additionally, in [7], a user
can access a television channel and play any video on his/her
mobile phone.
Since smart card-based networks and mobile phone users are
shifting to an ad hoc and comletely mobile mode, HES
cannot provide service to users everywhere. Therefore, when
mobile users leave an area covered by a HES, they should
receive services from another HES [8], [28], [9], [10]. First
of all, they have to be authenticated again. In [8] the Mobi-
Cash protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
was proposed, and [28] used symmetric encryption functions.
Constantin Popescu and Lo-yao Yeh’s schemes are also based
on bilinear pairing [9], [10].
Recently, user privacy has acquired special significance so that
the demand for anonymous communication in networks has
increased, and service providers have to authenticate users
remotely and anonymously [11], [12], [13]. Bapana describes
an anonymous authentication protocol suitable for distributed
computer networks [14]. Yang et al. proposed a two-party
secure roaming protocol based on identity based signatures
(IBS) [12]. There are multiple servers, and each server
manages a set of subscribers who are users of the network. De-
dong et al. presented a model of two access modes: self-access
and cross-domain access [13]. In self-access, the internet
service providers (ISP ) provide service to users directly, and
cross-domain access is similar to that of a roaming network.
Anonymous authentication schemes could meet these require-
ments. The validity and legality of a user’s identity is approved
in anonymous authentication schemes while divulging their
true identity to no one. In some schemes, not only is the user’s
identity anonymous on public networks and channels, but users
inside the network and attackers also cannot retrieve the user’s
ID [14], [16]. Even the server occasionally does not realize
the user’s ID [18]. In some schemes, there is no registration
table for user authentication on the server [18], but the server
can validate and authenticate the users anonymously.
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Our main contributions are listed follows:
• We present a great user anonymity. It means that we
assume that an adversary has the server secret key and
user password, but it cannot obtain the user’s identity.
• We improve the Chen’s scheme [16] against privilege
insider attack attack. It means that the severs have no
ability to obtain the users sensitive information.
• We improve the Chen’s scheme [16] against user trace-
ability attack.
• We analyze the alleviated scheme using both heuristic
and formal methods.
In this paper, after discussing related work in section 2 and
prerequisites for the scheme in section 3, we describe and
analyze Chen et. al’s scheme[16] in section 4. It should be
noted that Kim et al have also promoted this scheme against
stolen smart card-based attacks [19], but it is almost infeasible
as long as the user chooses just strong password because
it requires succeed brute force attack. In the following, we
explain our alleviated scheme. Then, we analyze the alleviated
scheme in heuristic and formal forms. Finally, we compare our
scheme with recently proposed schemes.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we categorize pay-TV systems in 4 groups.
At first, we describe signature-based pay-TV systems. Blind
signature is practical way to verify user authentication by valid
party, anonymously. Other categories are based on bilinear
pairing, digital signature, encryption/decryption function, and
hash function. Since hash function are light and secure, it is
applied for lightweight schemes which are suitable for weak
devices such as sensors and smart phones. We depict this
section on the table I, in summery.
• Pairing-based pay-TV systems
Other researchers proposed heavy scheme based on bilin-
ear pairnig, such as Wang et al proposed an authentication
scheme for access control in mobile pay-TV systems,
in 2012 [17]. Their protocol was resist against forgery,
Man-in-the-Middle MitM , and replay attacks. Thus, an
adversary can pass the verification phase successfully.
Its performance is good, but as we said, it is based on
bilinear pairing and that’s not suitable for lightweight
devices. In 2013, Liu used identity-based encryption in
his scheme [5]. A number of schemes also used crypto-
graphic functions and bilinear pairings (e.g., [6], [28], [9],
[10]). Sabzinejad Farash made improvments [10] against
impersonation attacks (User impersonation and HES
impersonation) in [6]. Sabzinejad Farash’s scheme [6] is
also a robust and secure system which is the running time
of protocol shorter than the previous schemes. However,
his proposed scheme is designed with bilinear pairing.
It is too heavy and unsuitable for the weak devices. In
2015, Heydari et al proposed an authentication scheme
resists against impersonation attack. They launched their
attack on issue phase and generalized it on other phases
[27].
Recently, Wu et al. proposed an authentication schemes
for mobile pay-TV, but it does not support anonymity
[28]. Anonymity is being supported through pairing
transform in [29]. Also, in 2017, Wu et al. proved
that the Sabzinejad protocol has some weaknesses [30].
For example, it does not support mutual authentication.
But there is no modified scheme. Then, Biesmans et al
proposed pay-per-view and a pay-per-channel that protect
users’ privacy [40].
• Signature-based pay-TV systems
A user’s connection with banks is another payment
method that can be mentioned. Blind signature is another
method for anonymization. In this method, a legitimate
party signs the blinded message of users. After signing,
other people can see the original message along with the
valid signatures of the legal party. In 1996, Camenisch
presented a communication scheme in an anonymous way
in which a blind signature was used [20]. Subsequently,
authors have tried to provide more efficient schemes for
mobile-pay systems. Customers in this scheme have to
open an anonymous account and there is no need for
the bank to identify the customers. In 2009 Bakhtiari
et al presented the MobiCash scheme based on the
blind signature and the customer’s relationship with the
bank [8]. Its blind signature is based on ECDSA crypto
system. In 2016, Wu et.al proposed an efficient scheme
[28]. Their scheme is a powerful scheme based on user
signature. The user who wants to uses TV, must register
as legal user via proposed scheme and creates session
key to watch the TV. The user signs its message and
sends it to server. Server verifies the received message
with open.algorithm which is proposed in this scheme.
• Encryption-based pay-TV systems
Encryption-based schemes are most practical classifica-
tion. This category neither heavy nor light. Thus, are
not suitable for weak devices. For example, Yang J-H
and Chang proposed ID-based scheme on ECC crypto
system for remote user authentication [15]. It has some
drawbacks such as vulnerability to insider and imperson-
ation attacks [16]. In the hash-based pay-TV system (the
next category), we describe Chen’s scheme [16] and then
analyse it in the section 4. In 2017 Arshad et al proposed
an efficient scheme [39] based on Wang’s scheme [17].
But, there is no bilinear pairing functions and Arshad’s
scheme is easy to implement on FPGA boards.
• Hash-based pay-TV systems
In 2011, Chen modified the ECC-based scheme of Yang
J-H and Chang [15]. The modified protocol is lightened
and redesigned only with hash function but without ECC
using [16]. Then in 2012, Kim et al improved Chen’s
scheme [16] and made it robust against smart card-
based attacks [19]. We will explain in section 4 that the
improvement is not true.
In recent years, low energy consumption on smart cards
has been motivated by an increase in the energy efficiency
and productivity of schemes so that some of the designed
TABLE I
AN OVERVIEW ON THE SECTION 2
Information → Base Article or Cryptographic functions Contribution
Schemes ↓ Year improvement of. BP E/D/Sig H (in summery)
Camenicsh [20] 1996 Brickell 1995 [22] No Yes Yes Proposed an anonymous electronic
Stadler 1995 [23] payment system
Bakhtiari [8] 2009 Abbadasari 2004 [42] No Yes Yes Proposed a MobiCash system
Chen [16] 2011 Yang 2009 [15] No No Yes Improved Yang’s scheme [15] against
insider and impersonation attack
Kim [19] 2012 Chen 2011 [16] No No Yes Improved Chen’s scheme [16] against smart
card-based attacks. We explain in the
section 4 that the improvement is not true
Wang [17] 2012 Sun 2009 [41] Yes Yes Yes Improved Sun’s scheme [41] against
MitM and impersonation attacks
Liu [5] 2013 Sun 2009 [41] Yes Yes Yes Privacy preserving
Reduce the computation overhead
Tsai [24] 2014 Li 2012 [21] No No Yes Proposed a protocol based on chaotic map
Sabzinejad 2014 Yeh 2012 [10] Yes Yes Yes Improved Yeh’s scheme [10] against head-
Farash [6] end system impersonation attack
Reduced the computation overhead
Heydari [27] 2015 Wang 2012 [17] Yes Yes Yes Improved Wang’s scheme [17] against
impersonation attack
Reduced the computation overhead
Kou [26] 2015 Choi 2014 [38] No No Yes Improved Choi’s scheme [38] against
stolen smart card and impersonation attacks
Wu [28] 2016 He 2016 [29] Yes Yes Yes Added anonymity to He’s scheme [29]
Wu [30] 2017 Sabzinejad Added mutual authentication to
Farash 2014 [6] Sabzinejad Farash [6]
Arshad [39] 2017 Wang 2012 [17] No Yes Yes Made Wang’s scheme [17] efficient, and
implements it on FPGA boards
Biesmans [40] 2018 Attrapadung 2009 [43] Yes Yes Yes Privacy preserving
Note:
BP : Bilinear Pairing E/D/Sig: Encryption/Decryption/Digital Signature H: Hash function
schemes for smart cards are hash-based and have high
energy consumption efficiency (e.g., [21], [24], [26]). In
2014, Tsai proposed a light anonymous authentication
protocol [24]. Then, in 2015, Kuo et al. also presented
a lightweight scheme based on smart cards [26]. The
lightweight schemes are popular, since light devices have
been developed. So, we focus on this category of pay-TV
systems.
In the section 5, we discuss the [6], [10], [16], [19] and our
scheme, in the compare them with our improved scheme. We
illustrate that our alleviated scheme is more secure than noted
schemes.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we explain preliminaries of our paper. These
functions are used for lightweight protocols with low power
consumption, so common encryption functions are not used.
After presenting the required security features in anonymous
authentication schemes, we briefly explain cellular communi-
cation. Finally, we explain the analysis of schemes through a
formal method.
A. Parameters and Entities Description
a) Describe the entities involved in this paper: In Table
II, the list of entities and parameters are depicted. Below, we
explain the role of each of the entities [16].
• HES: A system sending broadcast TV service to re-
ceivers.
• Receiver: A mobile device with a CAS module used for
access control.
• SAS/SMS: Subsystems responsible for subscriber autho-
rization and management.
• Encrypter/Decrypter: Components for encrypting and
decrypting CW, keys and sensitive information.
• Multiplexer/Demultipexer: Components for multiplex-
ing and demultiplexing A/V, data or IP to MPEG-2.
• Scrambler/Desclamber: Components for signal scram-
bling and the reverse engineering of Scrambler.
• TX/RX: Subsystems for signal transmission and receiv-
ing.
• ECM/EMM: Defined by DV B as two conditional access
messages.
TABLE II
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Entities Description Parameters Description
HES Head End System S Server
SAS Subscriber Authorization System Ui The ith user
SMS Subscriber Management System IDi ID of ith user
CW Control Word PWi Password of ith user
CAS Conditional Access System b Random number
ECM Entitlement Control Message N User registration number
EMM Entitlement Management Message T Time stamp
DBS Data Base Server ∆T Ti − Tj
MUX Multiplexer Θ Token for issue phase
DEMUX Demultiplexer γ Token for subscription phase
TX Transmitter γi Token for hand-off phase
RX Receiving module h(.) Secure one-way hash function
MS Mobile device ⊕ XOR operation
DV B Digital Video Broadcast ‖ Concatenate operation
A The Adversary y The secret key of the remote server
∗ The stared parameters are generated by adversary
B. Security Requirements
In this section, we mention the definitions of security
requirements and the need for anonymous authentication pro-
tocols with multi-server service providers. Noted that the
hash function have to be secure in standard model against
relevant attacks. One-way hash functions with no collisions
are functions with variant input and constant length output.
From their characteristics, we can note that they do not have
collisions and that they are one-way [32].
• Privacy Preserving
Privacy is a range of personal and private information
of the user that the user wants to be protected and
unavailable toAs [33]. In this paper, user identity requires
protection. Because users want to log− in anonymously
and keeps his/her identity private.
• User Anonymity
User anonymity is a kind of privacy policy in networks.
User anonymity means that user’s identities cannot be
obtained and find a link to trace the users by any
channel eavesdropping, stolen smart card, or access to the
user database stored in server memory [31]. According
to increasing user requests to join the networks and
uses internet-based services, user’s privacy has become
particularly important and identity anonymity is more
considered.
• User Traceability
Traceability means that if a user logs − in to a server
several times, or to multiple servers in several different
points, A or other users cannot determine wheter is the
same user that was previously logged− in to the server
or not [35].
• Resistance against privilege insider attack
There are many HESes in the cellular network and users
can get services from them. They authenticate users and
then the users can use the services. To authenticate users,
the HESes obtain the real users’ identity and then verify
their log − in request. It is clearly that in this attack all
HESes know the real users’ identity and if one of the
HESes is malicious, the users’ privacy is broken [36].
But, we want to the HESes learn no privacy information
about the users’ identity.
• Forward and Backward Security
Forward security means that when the user is out of the
network (or network service is revoked) and he is not
a member of the network he must not retrieve encrypted
messages after leaving or revocation. In fact, it means that
the set of keys in the next sessions must be independent
of the set of keys in the previous ones. Backward security
means that if a user recently was a member of that
network with a new key to server, this user would no
longer retrieve previous session keys. This user cannot
retrieve the previous encrypted information by having
either the exchanged information in the past or the current
key [34].
• Mutual Authentication
For secure communication, it is necessary that both
parties presuade each other to confrim the identity. So,
the user is known to the server, and the user is able to
authenticate the server through the mutual authentication
protocol [18].
C. Formal Security Analysis
Many proposed anonymous authentication protocols have
been analyzed via ad hoc methods, but all of their drawbacks
have not been discovered. Hence, there is no doubt that a
formal method to discover the privacy and security drawbacks
is required. A’s capabilities and threat models are classified in
formal analysis. In this case, the adversary is capable of not
only eavesdropping on the channel but also revealing secret
data via data recovery through smart card power analysis
attack [37].
A game-based model is applied to prove each attack. A tries
to success in the designed game. We illustrate that A succeeds
in designed game over Chen’s scheme [16]. However, it fails
in designed games over our improved scheme. According
to the protocol’s attributes, a formal analysis method has
TABLE III
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MS AND HESES
Ui S
Initialization phase  Secure channel
Issue phase  Public channel
Subscription phase  Public channel
Hand-off phase  Public channel
three functions [37], [33]: (i) the experiment function, (ii) the
success function, and (iii) the probability function. as follows:
• Experiment function (EXP): A performs the process to
get the required information.
• Success function (Succ): It specifies how successful A
is in gaining important data.
• Probability function (Pr): A’s probability of success in
the recovery of secret values.
If the probability of success is negligible (), the latter
protocol is secure against assumed A [33].
SuccProtocol−nameA = Pr[EXP
H.P.
A ] ≤ 
D. Adversary abilities
In this section we describe A abilities. We allow A to
achieve all parameters stored in smart card and database of
servers, and it can eavesdrop the public channel, to show the
security power of our alleviated scheme.
In the following we describe A abilities [11], [36], briefly:
• A can eavesdrop the public channel.
• A can achieve to parameters stored in smart card.
• A can achieve to verification table which is the servers
has access to it.
In the section 4.3, we show our scheme is secure against all of
smart card-based and stolen server attacks, as well as privacy
drawbacks such as lack of anonymity and traceability. In the
following, after explaintion of Chen’s scheme [16] and its
weaknesses, we depirt our modified scheme indetails.
IV. REVIEW OF THE CHEN ET AL. SCHEME
In this section, we investigate Chen’s scheme [16]. This
scheme has 4 phases: initialization, issue, subscription and
hand-off. After briefly explaining the procedure of this pro-
tocol, we mention its weaknesses.
The Figure 1 shows the structure of general mobile pay-TV
system. The Figure 2 and the Table III depict the the phases of
Chen’s scheme and correspondence between MS and HESes.
• Initialization phase
Users are registered in DBS of HES through
SAS/SMS, and their ID is stored in DBS along with
N. If N = 0, the user’s identity and N = 1 is stored.
These communications are carried out through a secure
channel. To perform this process, the following steps are
performed by Ui:
Ui chooses IDi, PWi, and generates b. Then it computes
PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b) and submits IDi and PWBi to
S.
S checks IDi is already in its database or not. Then it
calculates:
K = h(IDi ⊕ PWBi)
Q = h(UD‖x)⊕ PWBi
R = h(PWBi‖IDi)⊕ h(y)
Here UD = h(IDi‖N). S issues the smart card contain-
ing [K,R,Q] and sends it to Ui over secure channel.
Ui stores b on smart card. The smart card contains
[K,R,Q, b]
• Issue phase
For each log − in and acquisition of service from each
HES in the network, the user should send a log − in
request and receives a Θ as a token. This token is used
in the subscription phase. Kim et al. has attacked this
phase [19]. The attack scenario is as follows:
A listens to a user’s session in the issue phase and
steals the user’s smart card. A could obtain P from
Ci = h(P‖CIDi‖T1‖ni) by using the values of Ci,
CIDi, T1, and ni from the intercepted messages [19].
Due to the security of the secure one-way hash function,
the probability of retrieving P from Ci is negligible (ε).
As a result, A cannot impersonate the user, and Chen’s
scheme is secure against stolen smart card attacks. In the
following we describe the issue phase of Chen’s scheme:
Ui enters IDi and PWi and computes:
PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b)
K = h(IDi ⊕ PWBi)
P = Q⊕ PWBi
h(y) = h(PWBi‖IDi)⊕R
Then it generates a random number ni and calculates:
Rt = Ri ⊕ h(y‖ni)
CIDi = IDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
Ci = h(P‖CIDi‖T1|ni)
and sends m = [Ri, Ci, CIDi, T1, ni] to HES.
HES receives m at T2 and performs the following steps:
Checks T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T (acc/rej). Then it calculates:
IDi = CIDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
and verifies IDi if is a valid user identity. Else, it
terminates the log − in request. Then calculates:
P ′ = h(UD‖x) = h(h(IDi‖N)‖x)
C ′i = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T1‖ni)
then it checks C ′i = Ci, if they are equal HES accepts
the log − in request and calculates Rt = Ri ⊕ h(y‖ni).
Now, it chooses Θi, then calculates:
Di = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T2‖ni)
Fig. 1. The structure of CAS in a general mobile pay-TV system [16]
Fig. 2. The phases of the Chen’s scheme [16]
Ei = Θi ⊕ h(P ′‖T2‖ni)
HES broadcasts the mutual authentication message
m2 = [Di, Ei, T2].
Ui receives m2 and checks the T3 − T2 ≤ ∆T (acc/rej).
Then it computes D′i = h(P‖CIDi‖T2‖ni) and checks
D′i = Di. Finally, it calculates certified token θ =
Ei ⊕ h(P‖T2‖ni) as the session key to get Pay-TV
service.
• Subscription phase
For communicating with HES using the obtained Θ
communicated with HES and calculated γ. Then, it
communicated with HES and set the authentication key.
To calculate γ the following steps should be done:
Ui inputs its ID and PW and computes:
PW = h(PWi ⊕ b)
h(IDi ⊕ PWBi)
K = h(IDi ⊕ PWBi)
P = Q⊕ PWBi
h(y) = h(PWBi‖IDi)
then it generates a random number ni and calculates:
Ri = θi ⊕ h(y‖ni)
CIDi = IDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
Ci = h(P‖CIDi‖T1‖ni)
and sends m = [Ri, Ci, CIDi, T1, ni] to HES.
HES receives m at T2 and checks T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T
(acc/rej). Then calculates IDi = CIDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
and verifies if IDi is valid user’s identity and computes
P ′ = h(UD‖x) = h(h(IDi‖N)‖x). Then it checks
C ′i = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T1‖ni) = Ci. If they are equal,
HES accepts the log − in request and computes θ =
Ri⊕h(y‖ni). HES chooses a random number γi for Ui
and calculates:
Di = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T2‖ni)
Ei = γi ⊕ h(P ′‖T2‖ni)
Finally, it broadcasts m2 = [Di, Ei, T2].
After receiving M2 in T3, Ui checks T3− T2 ≤ ∆T and
if is valid checks D′i = h(P‖CIDi‖T2‖ni) = Di. Then
calculates the certified token γi = Ei ⊕ h(P‖T2‖ni) to
get Pay-TV service.
• Hand-off phase
In the hand-off phase for leaving the covered area of each
HES and communicating with another HES, another
γ should be calculated as γi and used for obtaining
future services from HES. In fact, in this phase, the
users are re-authenticated without relog − in and set a
new authentication session key to obtain new HES. To
calculate new authentication session key, Ui should be
done the following steps:
It generates a new random number ni and computes:
Zi = θi ⊕ h(y‖ni)
CIDi = IDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
Ci = h(P‖CIDi‖ni)
then it sends m = [Zi, Ci, CIDi, T1, ni] to HES
HES receives m at T2 and checks T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T , then
calculates:
IDi = CIDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
P ′ = h(h(IDi‖N)‖x)
and checks C ′i = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T1‖ni) = Ci and if
they are equal accepts the request. For verifying Ui’s
request, it calculates θi = Zi ⊕ h(y‖ni) and chooses γ
as authentication session key and calculates:
Di = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T2ni)
Fi = γi ⊕ h(P ′‖T2‖ni)
and broadcasts the mutual authentication message m2 =
[Di, Fi, T2].
TABLE IV
THE PRIVILEGE INSIDER ATTACK
Algorithm1
Set up:
Input: CIDi, T1, & ni received from public channel
Output: IDi
Challenge:
1. Receives CIDi, T1 & ni from public channel
2. Computes ID∗i = CIDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
Guess:
3. If ID∗i = IDi then
Return 1 and accept ID∗i as valid IDi (user’s ID)
else
return 0
Ui receives m2 at T3 and checks T3 − T2 ≤ ∆T and
D′i = h(P
′‖CIDi‖T2‖ni) = Di and if they are equal, it
accepts HES’s request of mutual authentication. Finally
Ui calculates γi = Fi⊕h(P‖T2‖ni) as the authentication
session key to obtain new HES’s service.
A. The Weaknesses of Chen et al. Scheme
In this section, we mention the weaknesses of Chen scheme,
including privilege insider attack (subsequent breaking user
privacy by the HES, means that the malicious HES can ob-
tain the users’ identity and traces them), and user traceability.
1) Privilege insider attack: According to the section 3.2
and 3.4, we assume that the HESes are malicious. In the
issue phase of Chen protocol, all HESes have y, which is the
particular key of the server, and therefore they can use it to
calculate Rt = Ri⊕h(y‖ni) and IDi = CIDi⊕h(y‖T1‖ni).
In fact, is clear, each HESes can calculate values such as Ri
and IDi through y. On the table IV (algorithm1), we describe
this process in detail.
After obtain the real users’ identity, Some users’ privacy are
broken as fellows:
• Breaking User Anonymity: The IDi is not directly
located on the channel, users’ IDs can be accessed by a
simple relation using the information received from the
public channel. To obtain the user’s identity, it is enough
to calculate the IDi = CIDi ⊕ h(y||T1||ni) via the
CIDi, ni, and Ti received from the public channel and
knowing y. In such a case, the user’s ID can be retrieved.
This procedure is described in Table IV (Algorithm1).
According to the Table IV, We prove that malicious
HES succeeds in the designed game. Therefore, A can
retrieve a real user ID simply with a probability of 1,
so: SuccChenA = 1.
• User Traceability: According to the procedure demon-
strated in Table IV, malicious HES is able to find the
user’s identity easily and grabs IDi. Although, it can
trace similarly the user with the algorithm1, cannot
obtain that which user re-authenticates without re-login.
But it can the user in the hand off phase is same user
that has been in issue phase.
2) User traceability: According to definition of user trace-
ability mentioned in the section 3.2, A should not get any
TABLE V
THE USER TRACEABILITY
Algorithm2
Set up:
Input: CIDi, T1, & ni eavesdropped from public channel
Output: 0 or 1
Challenge:
1. Eavesdrops CIDi, T1, & ni from public channel
2. Chooses randomly y∗
3. Computes ID∗i = CIDi ⊕ h(y∗‖T1‖ni)
4. Creates a set of ID∗i s and stores it
Guess:
5. Challenger has to calculate new ID∗i like line 3
If the new calculated ID∗i is in the created set
return 1 (success), ID∗i was loged− in on the server
else
return 0 (failure), ID∗i never loged− in on the server
information about users identity. It is clearly that A has no
information about y. with having y, A can obtain IDi. But,
there is no need to obtain the real user identity. In this attack,
A wants to know the authenticated user is the same user that
was previously loged− in to the server or not.
To achieves its goal, after eavesdropping each CIDi, T1, and
ni form public channel, A chooses randomly unique y∗ and
calculates ID∗i = CIDi ⊕ h(y∗‖T1‖ni) as pseudonym of all
users send log−in request and stores all calculated ID∗i s in its
memory. After a while, A eavesdrops the public channel and
calculate ID∗i and compares it with stored set of ID
∗
i s. If new
calculated ID∗i is in stored set, the user is in the authentication
phase, is the same user which A calculated its pseudonym and
stored its ID∗. Now, A can guess this user was loged− in on
the server or not with probability of 1. In fact it can classify
all users in two groups. The first group: the group which
has anonymous members, but A knows the group members
was loged − in on the server. The second group: it has the
anonymous members, but A knows the groups members never
loged−in on the server. We describe this process on the Table
V.
3) Soundness: In the issue phase, subscription phase and
hand-off phase of Chen’s scheme the following parameters are
calculated by users:
Ri = Rt ⊕ h(y‖ni)
CIDi = IDi ⊕ h(y‖T1‖ni)
Ri = Θi ⊕ h(y‖ni)
Zi = Θt ⊕ h(y‖ni)
According to Chen’s scheme, y is the secret key of the remote
server stored in the hash function [16]. So, the users have no
ability to calculate the mentioned parameters and they cannot
use y.
B. Our Improved Scheme
In this section, we propose an improved issue of Chen
scheme. Our improved scheme has 4 phases which we describe
as below, and compare our changes with the original scheme.
We represent the protocol’s procedure indetails in Tables VI
to IX.
• Initialization Phase
Which is shown in Table VI, the server calculates Ri,
and Qi according to the Table VI after receiving IDi,
and PWBi, and then stores Ri, Qi and PWBi in its
database. In the following, we describe this process in
details:
Ui: Ui generates b as random number and chooses PWi.
Then it computes PWB = h(PWi‖b) and sends PWBi
and IDi to the pay-TV server.
S: After receiving PWBi and IDi, S computes Qi =
h(IDi‖x) ⊕ PWBi and Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi). Then it
stores Ri, Qi, and Qi⊕PWBi in its database and issues
smart card containing [Ri, Qi]. S send issued smart card
to Ui.
Ui: Ui stores b on smart card memory and keeps it secure.
• Issue Phase
The mobile user generates ni as random number and
calculates Ri via the PWi, IDi, and Ri and being
authenticated. Then, it calculates and sends a log − in
request to HES. In the next step, after the time stamp
and the user’s ID verification, the server calculates Ei
and Di and broadcasts m2. The user also calculates Θ
as the Authentication session key after checking ∆T and
verifying its value. This session is shown in Table VII.
The mentioned process is depicted in the following:
Ui: Ui inputs its ID, and PW and computes:
PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b)
Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi)
Smart card checks Ri and verifies it. Then generates ni
and calculates:
Kn = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ ni
CIDi = Kn⊕ h(Kn‖T1‖ni)
Ci = h(Qi‖CIDi‖T1‖ni)
Rt = Ri ⊕Kn
Smart card sends m1 = [Kn,Ci, T1, ni] to S.
S: S receives m1 at T2 and checks T2−T1 ≤ ∆T . Then
it computes Kn ⊕ ni = Qi ⊕ PWBi and searches it in
its database, then verifies it. Else, terminates this phase.
S checks C ′i = h(Qi‖Kn⊕h(Kn‖T1‖ni)‖T1‖ni) = Ci
and verifies it. Then it chooses the token Θ and stores it
on DBS and computes:
Di = h(Ri ⊕Kn‖CIDi‖T2‖ni)
Ei = Θ⊕ h(Qi‖T2‖ni ⊕Qi ⊕Kn)
and broadcasts m2 = [Di, Ei, T2].
Ui: Ui receives m2 at T3 and checks T3−T2 ≤ ∆T . Then
it checks D′i = h(Rt‖CIDi‖T2‖ni) = Di and calculates
Θ = Ei ⊕ h(Qi‖T2‖ni ⊕ PWBi) as authentication
session key.
TABLE VI
INITIALIZATION PHASE - OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
Ui S
Chooses b as random number and inputs IDi, PWi & b
Computes PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b) PWBi,IDi−−−−−−−−→ Computes
Qi = h(IDi‖x)⊕ PWBi
Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi)
Stores random number b on smart card and smart Stores (Qi,Ri & Qi ⊕ PWBi) in DBS
card contains [Ri, Qi & b]
[Ri,Qi]←−−−−− Issues a smart card containing [Ri, Qi]
TABLE VII
ISSUE PHASE - OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
Ui [Ri, Qi & b] S [Qi, Ri, Qi ⊕ PWBi]
Inputs IDi & PWi
Computes PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b)
Verifies Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi) (acc/rej)
Generates ni and computes Kn = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ ni
Computes CIDi = Kn⊕ h(Kn‖T1‖ni) Receives message at T2
Ci = h(Qi‖CIDi‖T1‖ni) m1=[Kn,Ci,T1,ni]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Checks T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T
Rt = Ri ⊕Kn Computes Kn⊕ ni = Qi ⊕ PWBi
Checks Qi ⊕ PWBi (acc/rej)
C′i = h(Qi‖Kn⊕ h(Kn‖T1‖ni)‖T1‖ni) (acc/rej)
Receives m2 at T3 & checks T3 − T2 ≤ ∆T m2=[Di,Ei,T2]←−−−−−−−−−−− Chooses the token Θ & store in DBS
Computes D′i = h(Rt‖CIDi‖T2‖ni) (acc/rej) Computes Di = h(Ri ⊕Kn‖CIDi‖T2‖ni)
Authentication session Key Θ = Ei ⊕ h(Qi‖T2‖ni ⊕ PWBi) Ei = Θ⊕ h(Qi‖T2‖ni ⊕Qi ⊕Kn)
• Subscription Phase
Which is shown in Table VIII. After Θ calculation and
entering PWi and IDi, the user sends Knnew, Ci and
CIDi using the obtained Θ along with nnewi and T1
to HES. If HES authenticates the user’s ID, it will
broadcast m2 = [Di, Ei, T2] which contains γ. In the
following, We describe the subscription phase of our
alleviated scheme in details:
Ui: Ui inputs its ID, and PW and computes PWBi =
h(PWi ⊕ b). Then verifies Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi) and
generates nnewi and calculates following parameters:
Knnew = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ nnewi
CIDi = Kn
new ⊕ h(Knnew‖T1‖nnewi )
Ci = h(Qi‖CIDi‖T1‖nnewi )
Ri = Θ⊕Knnew
Ui sends m1 = [Knnew, Ci, T1, nnewi ] to HES.
S: S receives m1 at T2 and checks T2−T1 ≤ ∆T . Then
computes Knnew ⊕ nnewi = Qi ⊕ PWBi and checks
C ′i = h(Qi‖CIDi‖T1‖nnewi ) = Ci. S calculates Θ =
Ri⊕Knnew and chooses γ as token for Ui. S computes:
Dnewi = h(Ri‖CIDi‖T2‖nnewi )
Enewi = γi ⊕ h(Ri‖T2‖nnewi ⊕Qi ⊕Knnew)
S broadcasts m2 = [Dnewi , E
new
i , T2].
Ui: receives m2 at T3 and checks T3 − T2 ≤ ∆T . Then
it checks D
′new
i = h(Ri‖CIDi‖T2‖nnewi ) = Dnewi and
computes γi = Enewi ⊕ h(Ri‖T2‖nnewi ⊕ PWBi) as
authentication session key to get services.
• Hand-off Phase
Any user who wants to leave a HES region and log− in
to another HES region have to go through this step
according to Table IX. Since the user is in the primary
HES region, no log − in is required. In fact, the user
is re-authenticated without re-login. When this step is
finished, the user obtains γnewi for communicating with
the new HES. The hand-off phase of our alleviated
scheme is shown on the Table IX.
According to the Table IX, S replaces PWBi ⊕ Qi ⊕
h(y‖Ri) on PWBi ⊕Qi stored in its database.
C. Security Analysis of Our Improved Scheme
This section is composed of three subsections. After ex-
planation of the reason of our changes, analyze the improved
scheme both heuristically and formally is analyzed.
Now, we analyze the main changes in our improved scheme
compared with Chen’s scheme. depicted in Tables VI to IX.
• Removing N from DBS of HES: By storing Qi, Ri,
and PWBi ⊕ Qi, the server does not need to store
N anymore in DBS of HES. Each user authenticates
anonymously after sending the log− in request for each
HES in the authentication phase by HES with stored
parameters in DBS of HES.
• Removing h(y) from R: As in the Chen scheme, h(y) is
the public key of the server, and it is available to all users.
Its presence or absence in R value does not guarantee any
security.
• Lack of using y in the generation phase: We do not use
y to prevent ”user impersonation” and ”user traceability”
attacks. We used Qi, and Ri instead. Qi and Ri are joint
TABLE VIII
SUBSCRIPTION PHASE - OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
Ui [Ri, Qi & b] S [Qi, Ri, Qi ⊕ PWBi]
Inputs IDi & PWi
Computes PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b)
Verifies Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi) (acc/rej)
Generates nnewi and computes Kn
new = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ nnewi
Computes CIDi = Knnew ⊕ h(Knnew‖T1‖nnewi ) Receives message at T2
Ci = h(Qi‖CIDi‖T1‖nnewi )
m1=[Kn
new,Ci,T1,n
new
i ]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Checks T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T
Ri = Θ⊕Knnew Computes Knnew ⊕ nnewi = Qi ⊕ PWBi
Checks Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ h(y‖Ri) (acc/rej)
C′i = h(Qi‖Knnew ⊕ h(Knnew‖T1‖nnewi )‖T1‖nnewi ) (acc/rej)
Receives m2 at T3 & checks T3 − T2 ≤ ∆T
m2=[D
new
i ,E
new
i ,T2]←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Θ = Ri ⊕Knnew
Computes D′newi = h(Ri‖CIDi‖T2‖nnewi ) (acc/rej) Chooses token γ for Ui
Computes γi = Enewi ⊕ h(Ri‖T2‖nnewi ⊕ PWBi) as Computes Dnewi = h(Ri‖CIDi‖T2‖nnewi )
Authentication key to get services Enewi = γi ⊕ h(Ri‖T2‖nnewi ⊕Qi ⊕Knnew)
TABLE IX
HAND-OFF PHASE - OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
Re-authentication without re-login
Ui [Ri, Qi & b] S [Qi, Ri, Qi ⊕ PWBi]
Generates nnewi and computes Kn
new = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ nnewi
Computes CIDi = Knnew ⊕ h(Knnew‖T1‖nnewi ) Receives message at T2
Ci = h(Qi‖CIDi‖T1‖nnewi )
m1=[Ci,Ti,n
new
i ]−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Checks T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T
Computes Knnew ⊕ nnewi = Qi ⊕ PWBi
Checks Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ h(y‖Ri) (acc/rej)
Replaces PWBi ⊕Qi ⊕ h(y‖Ri) on PWBi ⊕Qi
C′i = h(Qi‖Knnew ⊕ h(Knnew‖T1‖nnewi )‖T1‖nnewi ) (acc/rej)
Chooses the new authentication session key γnew and
Receives m2 at T3 and checks T3 − T2 ≤ ∆T (acc/rej)
m2=[D
new
i ,Fi,T2]←−−−−−−−−−−−−− computes Dnewi = h(Ri‖CIDi‖T2‖nnewi )
Computes D
′new
i = h(Ri‖CIDi‖T2‖nnewi ) Fi = γnewi ⊕ h(Ri‖T2‖nnewi ⊕Qi ⊕Knnew)
Computes γnewi = Fi ⊕ h(Ri‖T2‖nnewi ⊕ PWBi)
as new Authentication session key to obtain new HES
parameter between Ui and HES. Ri and Qi are stored
in the user memory and DBS of HES produced by the
server.
1) Heuristic Security Analysis: In this section, we analyze
the improved scheme in heuristic form and show that our
scheme is resistant to all prevalent attacks. Imagin A has
possession of sensetive information stored on the card (with
power attack [18]). we prove that the scheme resists a stolen
smart card or stolen server. So, A cannot evade the users’
privacy or create any interference in communications.
• Stolen server database attack and stolen verification
table attack: By stealing the information stored on
the server, A achieves Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi), Qi =
h(IDi‖x) ⊕ PWBi ,PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b). We proof
that A has no ability to obtain sensitive parameters:
– For x retrieval, A needs to retrieve the hash
function value, which is impossible given the
secure hash function. Therefore, A must again
try to retrieve IDi first. Then it can run brute
force attack on x. So, its success probability is
(1/2)(Length−of−x)+(Length−of−IDi).
– For PWi retrieval, A needs to retrieve the hash func-
tion value, which is impossible given the secure hash
function. Therefore, A must again try to retrieve b
first. Then, it can retrieval PWi. So, its success prob-
ability is (1/2)(Length−of−b)+(Length−of−PWi).
– The other parameter which A wants to retrieve it,
is IDi stored in hash function. For retrieval it, A
has to run brute force attack with probability of
(1/2)Length−of−IDi .
• Stolen smart card attack: By server stealing and after
power analysis, A achieves Qi = h(IDi‖x) ⊕ PWBi,
Ri = h(PWBi‖IDi), and random number b. b does not
help A to obtain the sensitive information of terms Ri
and Q, A also needs an exponential− time, to achieve
them.
• Replay attack: There is the freshness of all sent flows
on the channel and the new random number and time
stamp, so there is no possibility for this attack. In fact,
if A intends to resend the previous messages, it needs to
access the term Ri. As mentioned in the previous section,
exponential time is needed to produce these parameters. It
should be noted that A could access Ri by possessing the
server, but if A is present at the highest level of attack
(stolen server) and it possesses the database of server,
there is no reason for the replay attack.
• Impersonation attack: For user impersonation, A needs
a pair of (IDi, PWi) or it should be able to produce Kn,
Ci, and CIDi. As explained in the previous sections,
in order to acquire or produce the desired parameters,
A needs exponential time and it cannot implement the
attack in polynomial time.
• Breaking user anonymity and user traceability at-
TABLE X
CHANNEL EAVESDROPPING
Algorithm3 EXPHashImpChen
Set up:
Input: Kn, Ci, T1, and ni eavesdropped from public channel
Output: 1 (success) / 0 (failure)
Challenge:
1. Eavesdrops Kn, Ci, T1, and ni from public channel eavesdropping
2. Computes Qi ⊕ PWBi = Kn⊕ ni
where Qi = h(IDi‖x)⊕ h(PWi ⊕ b) and PWBi = h(PWi ⊕ b)
3. Selects randomly ID∗i , x
∗, PW ∗i , and b
∗
4. Computes Kn∗ ⊕ n∗i = h(ID∗i ‖x∗)⊕ h(PW ∗i ⊕ b∗)⊕ h(PW ∗i ⊕ b∗)
Guess:
5. If Kn∗ ⊕ n∗i = Kn⊕ ni
Accepts selected ID∗i , x
∗, PW ∗i , and b
∗ as IDi, x, PWi, and b
Return 1 (success)
else
Return 0 (failure)
tacks: According to the Table VIII, it is clear that no
user ID trace is placed directly on the channel. The only
place that the user ID has been used is CIDi = Kn⊕
h(Kn‖T1‖ni) = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕ ni ⊕ h(Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕
ni‖T1‖ni) = h(IDi‖x)⊕ h(PWi ⊕ b)⊕ h(PWi ⊕ b)⊕
ni⊕h(h(IDi‖x)⊕h(PWi⊕b)⊕h(PWi⊕b)⊕ni‖T1‖ni)
that A is faced with this phrase with the possibility
of (1/2)Length−of−hash to retrieve the user ID. If A
possesses the database of a server, it can access the
user’s ID, but having the user ID without any adverse
information is not sufficiently useful. Card stealing and
the card data retrieval do not help A to achieve user’s
IDs. Regarding to protection of user ID, the user is
untraceable. A cannot calculate the user ID, so it cannot
trace the user in the hand-off phase.
• Channel eavesdropping attack: According to the de-
scription in previous sections, A cannot actively attack by
channel avoidance and having the transmitted information
on the channel. Also A cannot able to obtain user’s ID
via passive attack.
2) Formal Security Analysis: In this section, we analyze
our scheme in the formal model [37], [33], which is shown
in Tables X to XIII (Algorithms3 to Algorithms6). In the
algorithms, we show that our alleviated scheme is resistant
against ”channel eavesdrop” and ”stolen card attack” and in
random oracle model. By regarding the one-way hash function
(Note that the parameters represented by ∗ are generated by
A).
• Channel eavesdropping
A obtains Kn, Ci, T1, and ni with interception. To
recover the sensitive information about Ui, there must
be a process in accordance with the Algorithm3 that
shown on the Table X.
In the designed game noted on the Table X, A eavesdrops
Kn, Ci, T1, and ni from public channel and tries to guess
sensitive information. To pass the game successfully, it
has to guess IDi, x, PWi, and b correctly. Since the
maximum probability of success is (1/2)inputes−length.
So, A is not able to guess sensitive information correctly
TABLE XI
STOLEN SMART CARD
Algorithm4 EXPHashImpChen
Set up:
Input: Ri, and b recovered from smart card memory by power attack
Output: 1 (success) / 0 (failure)
Challenge:
1. Recovers Ri, and b from smart card by power analisys attack
2. Selects randomly PW ∗i and ID
∗
i as user’s private key and ID
3. Computes R∗i = h(h(PW
∗
i ⊕ b)‖ID∗i )
Guess:
4. If R∗i = Ri then
Accepts PW ∗i and ID
∗
i as user’s private key and ID
Return 1 (success)
else
Return 0 (failure)
in polynomial time.
SuccImp−ChenA−IDi = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)IDi−length
SuccImp−ChenA−x = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)x−length
SuccImp−ChenA−PWi = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)PWi−length
SuccImp−ChenA−b = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)b−length
SuccImp−ChenA = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)(IDi‖x‖PWi‖b)−length ≤ 
So, it can not guess mentioned parameters correctly.
• Stolen smart card attack
If the smart card is stolen and corrupted by power analysis
attack, A acquires stored data and tries to impersonate the
user or deceive the server. A this process according to
Tables XI and XII (algorithms 4 and 5). In this section,
the invader tries to recover 4 parameters. To indicate that
our improved scheme is secure against this attack, we
design two games shown in the Tables XI and XII. In the
games, A obtains Ri, Qi, and b from smart card memory
by power attack and runs the games mentioned in the
algorithm 4 and 5.
– After recovering Ri, and b, A tries to obtain the
user’s private key and ID which are described in
Table XI indetails.
According to the Table XI, A has no chance to obtain
a user’s private key and ID, so:
SuccImp−ChenA−PWi = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)PWi−length
SuccImp−ChenA−IDi = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)IDi−length
SuccImp−ChenA = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)(IDi‖PWi)−length ≤ 
– According to the recovering the server’s private key
which is described in Table X, if an output of
the algorithm3 is 1 (but, we prove formally, its
TABLE XII
STOLEN SMART CARD
Algorithm5 EXPHashImpChen
Set up:
Input: Qi and b recovered from smart card memory by power attack,
correct x, and PWi which are guess successfully from Table X
Output: 1 (success) / 0 (failure)
Challenge:
1. Recovers Qi from smart card by power attack
2. Assumes that x∗, and PW ∗i are correct
and Pr[x∗ = x ∩ PW ∗i = PWi] = 1
3. Selects randomly ID∗i
4. Computes Q∗i = h(ID
∗
i ‖x)‖h(PWi ⊕ b)
Guess:
If Q∗i = Qi then
Return 1 and accept ID∗i as user ID
else
return 0
probability is negligible). It means we assume that
A obtains the x, and PWi successfully and tries to
guess the IDi. To proof formally that A has no
ability to obtain the user ID and breaks the user
privacy, we design a game and depict it on the Table
XII.
In the algorithm5 we assume that Pr[x∗ = x ∩
PW ∗i = PWi] = 1. However, A can obtain the user
ID with negligible probability. We note that:
SuccImp−ChenA = Pr[EXP
hash
A |Pr[x∗ = x∩PW ∗i = PWi] = 1] ≤ 
We know that Pr[x∗ = x ∩ PW ∗i = PWi] ≤ .
So, A has no chance to guess IDi successfully. It is
great anonymity level (A has the server’s secret and
user’s password, but it cannot break the user privacy
and obtain user’s ID).
• Stolen server attack
According our alleviated scheme, Ri, and Qi are param-
eters stored in user memory and server database. So, the
designed games in this item are similar to previous item
(stolen smart card attack) and there is no need to repeat
the formal analysis for this item.
• Privilege insider attack
According to the section 3.2 and the definition of priv-
ilege insider attack, we assume that the servers are
malicious and we want that they have no information
about user identity. To prove that our alleviated scheme
is resists to privilege insider attack, we design a game
and show it on the Table XIII.
We assumed that, we have secure one-way hash function
and the success probability of obtain the hash argument
is negligible. So, we note for this item:
SuccImp−ChenA = Pr[EXP
hash
A ] ≤ (
1
2
)IDi−length
V. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our improved scheme with other
schemes in both security features and performance cost.
TABLE XIII
PRIVILEGE INSIDER ATTACK
Algorithm6 EXPHashImpChen
Set up:
Input: Kn, Ci, T1, and ni received form public channel
Output: 1 (success) / 0 (failure)
Challenge:
1. Receives Kn, Ci, T1, and ni form public channel
2. Computes Kn⊕ ni = Qi ⊕ PWBi
3. Searches Qi ⊕ PWBi and find Qi, and Ri
4. Computes PWBi = Qi ⊕ PWBi ⊕Qi
(Now, the challenger has Kn, Ci, T1, ni, Qi, Ri, and PWBi)
Note: Challenger wants to obtain IDi and it uses the parameters
contain user ID
Result: Challenger uses Ri, and Qi to recover IDi
5. Selects randomly ID∗i
6. Computes Q∗i = h(ID
∗
i ‖x)⊕ PWBi and
R∗i = h(PWBi‖ID∗i )
Guess:
If Q∗i = Qi, or R
∗
i = Ri
Return 1 and accepts ID∗i as user ID
else
return 0
• Security features
Chen et al proposed a scheme for mobile pay-TV [16],
and then Kim et al improved it in 2012 against the
stolen card attacks [19]. However, we mentioned in the
previous sections, the improvement seems to be wrong.
It has weaknesses such as breaking user privacy, user
traceability and some forms of computing like Chen’s
scheme. In this section, we showed in the Table XIV, the
benefits of our alleviated scheme compare with that of
Chen et al.
According to Table XIV, our improved scheme has even
more security features than Sabzinejad Farash’s scheme
[6] and our alleviated scheme much more lighter the
Farash’s scheme. Also, our scheme is more secure than
both Chen’s scheme [16] and its improvement proposed
in 2012 [19]. Our scheme is secure against stolen/lost
smart card, impersonation, and stolen verifier attacks, but
A can impersonate users in Yeh L’s scheme [10].
• Performance cost
In recent years, many anonymous athentication schemes
for mobil pay-TV are proposed. Some of them only
use of hash function and suitable for light device.
According to [39], we assume the execution time of
the hash function is 0.13µs and the execution time of
pairing function is 17500.354µs. It is clearly that the
pairing-based schemes are much heavier and slower than
the schemes use only hash function (for example, the
execution time of our improved scheme in issue phase is
1.3µs and the execution time of issue phase in Wu et al
[28] is about 2777.357µs). We depict in the Table XV
performance comparison of our improved scheme with
other light schemes.
TABLE XIV
SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON
hhhhhhhhhhhScheme
Security Feature S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
Chen et al [16] (2011) 3 3 3 5 5 3 5
Kim et al [19] (2012) 3 3 3 5 5 3 3
Yeh L [10] (2012) 5 5 3 3 3 3 3
Sabzinejad Farash [6] (2016) 3 3 3 3 3 5 3
Our Improved Scheme 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Note:
S1: Resistance against stolen/lost smart card attack and user impersonation attack
S2: Resistance against stolen verifier or stolen verification table and server impersonation attack
S3: Resistance against DoA attack
S4: Secure against privacy preserving (compromise user’s ID for other server, which is not
server that submitted user)
S5: Secure against user traceability
S6: Provide mutual authentication
S7: Resistance against privilege insider attack
TABLE XV
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
`````````Scheme
Feature P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Chen [16] 6 0.78 7 0.91 7 0.91 4 5
Kim [19] 7 0.91 20 1.3 7 0.91 4 5
Li [21] 5 0.65 9 1.17 20 2.6 6 4
Our scheme 3 0.39 6 0.78 4 0.52 3 4
Note:
P1: The number of hash function in registration phase
P2: The execution time of registration phase (µs)
P3: The number of hash function in issue phase - user side
P4: The execution time of issue phase - user side (µs)
P5: The number of hash function in issue phase - server side
P6: The execution time of issue phase - server side (µs)
P7: The number of parameters stored in the smart card
P8: The number of parameters send on public channel in issue phase
VI. CONCLUSION
To save energy, lightweight devices have become customary.
Light protocols should help them to develop. However, we
have to respect to their security and privacy policies. one
important aspect of privacy is an anonymity fulfilled by anony-
mous authentication protocols. Recently, a lot of anonymous
authentication protocols have been proposed which is based on
secure hash function or bilinear pairing transform. Hash-based
protocols are lightweight and quick to run. Our alleviated
protocol is more secure and lighter than mentioned protocols.
Since the light devices such as sensors, smart cards, and smart
phones are increasing, we predict lightweight protocols and
hash-based protocols will be more popular to be paid.
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